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CHAPTER 1 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Over time, corporate governance has become one of the most common terms in business.
1
 
Corporate governance does not have a specific definition but it is sometimes defined as the 
systems by which companies are directed and controlled.
2
 This actually means that the 
responsibility for the practice of corporate governance in a company lies with the board of 
directors. Corporate governance is sometimes referred to as a set of relationships among the 
company’s board, shareholders and stakeholders to ensure that the main objectives of the 
company are set and attained by monitoring the performance of the company.
3
 Corporate 
governance comprises various factors; however, this mini-thesis only focuses on the ownership 
and board composition aspects of corporate governance, and their impact on the performance and 
survival of family owned companies. 
The definition of a family typically varies by culture. A family usually refers to parents, children, 
siblings as well as extended family who are related through blood or marriage.
4
 Therefore, a 
family business is considered as one in which the family has a major influence on the company. 
The terms ‘family-owned firms’ and ‘family companies/businesses’ are used interchangeably. 
Family businesses are generally no different from other firms; the only difference between a 
family business and a non-family business is the separation of ownership from management. In a 
non-family company, managers are hired to fulfil their roles and responsibilities and are not 
impacted personally when the business fails, while in the family-owned company the managers 
are part of the family.
5
 A family business is described as one where the voting majority is in the 
                                                          
1 Brunninge O &Wiklund J ‘Corporate governance and strategic change in SME’s: The Effects of Ownership, Board 
Composition and Top Management Teams’ (2007) 29 Small Business Economics 295.   
2
 Rossow GJ & Malan DP ‘Corporate governance in South Africa’ (2002)37 Journal of Business Ethics 289. 
3
 Mallin AC Corporate Governance (2010) 85. 
4
 Uhlaner LM Corporate governance and family business (2013) 164.   
5
 Morris MH & Williams OR ‘Correlates of success in family business transition’ (1997) 12 Journal of Business 
Venturing 386 ( hereafter Correlates of success in family business transition). 
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hands of the controlling family.
6
 Some authors describe a family business as an organisation 
where the shareholders belong to the same family, and who participate in the management and 
operation of the company.
7
 
This study mainly focuses on small to medium family-owned companies and specifically on 
retail family-owned companies. The board composition is considered to apply best in medium to 
large family-owned companies as more family members become part of the business, so as to 
help in conflict resolution and to deal with the company’s growth.8 This study discusses the 
history of family-owned companies. It provides the background to family- owned companies and 
greater understanding of the role played by family-owned firms. This study identifies the 
challenges that family-owned firms face and which may impact on their performance and 
survival. It therefore compares corporate governance and its role in developing countries such as 
South African, and Brazil as well as recommendations of corporate governance in a developed 
country, such as, the United States of America (US). 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Family-owned companies are the most dominant businesses around the world. In most countries, 
family businesses are the ones that bring economic growth and play a huge role in employment.
9
 
For example, in Spain, family businesses contribute 65 per cent to the Gross National Product 
(GNP). In the US between 80 per cent and 90 per cent of businesses are family-owned and 
contribute more than 50 per cent of the GNP and to employment.
10
 Family businesses in some 
instances are small businesses which employ a few staff members while in other cases they are 
medium to large businesses and employ hundreds to thousands of staff. Family-owned 
companies face the complex challenges that not only affect the business but also the destiny of 
the owners, family members and employees.
11
 As much as family-owned firms contribute to the 
economy, they however have a very short life span. These family-owned companies have 
                                                          
6
Abouzaid S Family Business Governance Handbook (2011) 12. 
7
 Leach P Family Businesses: The Essentials (2007) 2. 
8
 Brenes ER & Requena B ‘Corporate governance and family business performance’ (2011)64 Journal of Business 
Research 281. 
9
 Abouzaid S Family Business Governance Handbook (2011) 12. 
10
 Morris MH & Williams OR ‘Correlates of success in family business transition’ (1997)386. 
11
 Leach P Family Businesses: The Essentials (2007) 1.  
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survival stages which they go through, but most of them do not survive the third generation stage 
as they are likely to fail.
12
 Statistics show that only 30 per cent of family-owned companies 
survive into the second generation, while 10 per cent of the companies are viable into the third 
generation, and 4 percent of family-owned companies operate into the fourth generation.
13
 
Therefore this study investigates the reasons why family- owned companies fail and do not 
survive for a long time. 
 
1.3 AIM OF RESEARCH 
This study aims to explicate the importance of corporate governance in terms of ownership and 
board composition on family-owned firm performance. The main challenges associated with the 
performance of a family-owned business are highlighted, and structures and practices proposed 
that can mitigate these challenges to ensure the sustainability of the company. This study seeks to 
make a significant contribution to promoting good governance in family-owned firms. 
Furthermore this study aims to assess whether ownership and board composition affect the 
performance and survival of family-owned companies as they are likely to fail. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH  QUESTION 
The study aims to examine the influence of corporate governance on the failure of family-owned 
companies. 
The study focuses on the following aspects of corporate governance: 
Can the board composition and ownership structure affect the performance of a family-owned 
business? 
 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This study seeks to make a significant contribution to promoting good governance in family-
owned firms in South Africa, and to contribute to the success of family-owned firms which are 
                                                          
12
Abouzaid S Family Business Governance Handbook (2011) 13. 
13
Brenes ER & Requena B ‘Corporate governance and family business performance’ (2011) 64 Journal of Business 
Research 281. 
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experiencing challenges regarding their ownership, board composition and firm performance. 
This study therefore seeks to assist family-owned companies by addressing the issues that affect 
their long term survival. 
 
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The primary interest of this study is to show the impact that corporate governance structures 
have on the performance of family-owned firms. In view of the purpose of the study, the desktop 
research method is used which consists of the study of books, internet sources, journals articles, 
theses, dissertations and reports. Using this technique helps to get an in-depth understanding of 
how the corporate governance system helps the performance of family-owned firms. 
A comparative approach is also adopted:  the board composition and corporate governance 
structures from South Africa and Brazil are examined. These countries are both developing 
countries and consist of the majority of family owned businesses specifically Brazil. The United 
States is used as recommendations as it is a developed country and the business sector consists of 
majority family owned firms. Furthermore, these countries are all members of the United 
Nations (UN). Therefore the comparative study is important in analysing the corporate 
governance structures taking into account their level of development. 
 
1.7 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
Although many factors of corporate governance could be understood to have an important 
impact on family-owned firms, this study focuses on only ownership and board composition 
structure in South Africa and their impact on the performance of a family-owned firm. 
 
1.8 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The subsequent chapters deal with material as outlined below: 
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1.8.1 CHAPTER 2 
This chapter consults an extensive body of literature in order to provide a general overview of 
corporate governance, the definition of the term ‘corporate governance’, the importance of 
corporate governance, and the development of a corporate governance code. 
1.8.2 CHAPTER 3 
This chapter examines the main critical issues faced by family-owned firms. The challenges, the 
family life cycle, and the role of the board of directors are also discussed. This chapter also 
considers the importance of corporate governance in a family-owned firm, the advantages of 
having a formal governance structure in a family-owned firm, and the role of corporate 
governance in the performance of a family-owned firm 
1.8.3 CHAPTER 4 
This chapter compares how other countries, such as, South Africa and Brazil, exercise corporate 
governance specifically with regard to family-owned firms taking into account the 
recommendations from the United States. 
1.8.4 CHAPTER 5 
This chapter contains recommendations and identifies matters for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
GENERAL OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In today’s world there is an increasing number of corporate collapses and scandals. Therefore the 
need for corporate governance is undeniable.
14
 It has been found that many companies do not 
survive for a long time, specifically family owned companies,
15
 and a lack of corporate 
governance could be one of the contributing factors. A study by the Asian Development Bank 
confirmed that poor corporate governance is one of the contributing factors to the vulnerability 
and crisis of a company.
16
 
In addition to the argument above, there have been many cases of corporate scandals and 
collapses, which have forced government regulators and boards of corporations to reassess the 
essential issues of corporate governance, as they are important for the public interest.
17
 
In this chapter, the evolution of corporate governance is examined, and the definition of the term 
‘corporate governance’ by various authors is explained. The theoretical framework and the 
importance of corporate governance are explicated. Therefore this chapter focuses more on 
providing an understanding of what corporate governance is and how it was developed. The 
main reason for looking at corporate governance and its importance is because, this thesis is 
exploring the position of a family owned company and the direction in terms of rules, 
regulations, board structure and principles that most family owned companies should follow in 
order to be sustainable. 
 
                                                          
14
Lim L ‘Corporate Governance- A Survey of Australian and South East Asian system’ (2010) 9 Corporate 
governance eJournal  3.   
15
 Abouzaid S  Family Business Governance Handbook ( 2011) 13. 
16
 Lim L (2010) 4. 
17
 Keasey K Thomson S &Wright M The corporate governance problem competing diagnoses and solution (1997) 7.   
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2.2. OVERVIEW OF EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
Corporate governance came into existence after the ownership of the company was separated 
from its control. This means that the owners of companies had no control over the management 
as the responsibility to manage relied more on the directors of the company. However, this 
created challenges as the directors were in a position to abuse their power for their own benefit. 
Therefore corporate governance was introduced in order to prevent this.
18
 In today’s world the 
need for corporate governance is evident. 
The development of corporate governance has been driven to a large extent by the need for 
transparency and accountability, to help re-establish the confidence of investors in the world’s 
stock market after the damage caused by corporate collapses and scandals. Corporate governance 
includes codes and guidelines which are used by different bodies, ranging from committees to 
government departments.
19
 In South Africa (SA) these codes and guidelines consist of the King 
Reports and the Companies Act of 2008. 
The first King Report was published in 1994 by the King Committee on Corporate Governance. 
The aim of the Report was to promote the highest standards of corporate governance in South 
Africa.
20
 The focus of the King I Report was to promote good governance in the interest of 
stakeholders. The King Committee showed the need for corporate governance in companies in 
that it recognized that they no longer act independently from the society in which they operate. 
The Committee later reviewed the King I Report and proposed for it to be updated; and that is 
when the King II Code was developed.
21
 
The King II Report on Corporate Governance was published by the King Committee in 2002. It 
contained a code of corporate practices and conduct. Therefore, the 2002 King II Report was a 
development from King I. The Report shows a shift from the single bottom line, which is profit 
for shareholders, to a triple bottom line, which embraces the economic and social aspects of a 
                                                          
18
 Malan DP, Rossouw GJ & Van der Watt A ‘Corporate governance in South Africa’ (2002)37 Journal of Business 
Ethics 289. 
19
 King II Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa  (2002) 9. 
20
 King II Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa  (2002) 7. 
21
 King II Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa  (2002) 7. 
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company’s activities. The King II Report emphasizes the issues of fairness, transparency, 
accountability and responsibility. This Report states that the focus should not be only on the 
shareholders but the stakeholders as well.
22
 
South Africa has governing legislation both for public and private companies in the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008. The Act is mandatory, and companies need to adhere to the principles set out in 
the Act without any exceptions. The companies act requires companies to have directors and the 
duty of directors applies to all companies and is complemented by the King III code of Corporate 
Governance principles.
23
 The Companies Act 71 of 2008 enforced a need for the development of 
the King III Report. This Report was compiled by the King Committee along with the help of 
subcommittees.
24
 On September 2009 the King III Report was released and became effective in 
March 2010. 
25
 The King III Report applies to all the entities whether they are public, private or 
non-profit organisations. The Report includes an ‘apply’ or ‘explain’ approach in its principles, 
where a company needs to apply corporate governance practices and if not should explain the 
reason for not applying them. According to the King III Report, the board of companies should 
comprise of a majority of non-executive directors of which the majority should be independent. 
The board should assess the independence of the directors and the results be reported at all times; 
thus showing transparency. According to the King III report, the board is responsible to manage 
corporate governance effectively. When the board determines the strategy of the company, it 
must ensure that strategy, risk, performance and sustainability are inseparable.
26
  The King III 
Report is voluntary. Voluntary means that all entities even those listed on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE) should apply certain principles and if they cannot apply should at least 
explain the reason for not applying them.
 
This level of disclosure allows stakeholders to 
challenge the board to improve the level of governance within an organisation.
27
 The need for 
companies to use the ‘apply and explain’ approach came into place and the development for 
King IV came into effect. Recently the draft King IV report was published in November 2016 
and will come into effect in April 2017. The report became necessary due to the developments in 
                                                          
22
 King II Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (2002) 7. 
23
The Companies Act No. 71 of 2008. South Africa. 
24
 King III Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (2009) 6. 
25
King III Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (2002) 6. 
26
 Principle 2.2 of King III Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (2009). 
27
 King III Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (2002) 8. 
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corporate governance since King III came into effect in 2009.
28
 The King IV report consists of 
principles, practices and outcomes which serve as the benchmark for corporate governance in 
South Africa.
29
 The King IV report has been developed in order to compete with an increasingly 
demanding and dynamic external environment for different kinds of organisations which consists 
of Small to Medium Enterprises (SME’s), Non-profit organisations, Public sector organisations 
and entities, Municipalities and entities, Municipalities and Pension funds. The need for good 
corporate governance is essential for these organisations in order to be able to compete 
successfully. According to the King IV report, an organisation that adopts good corporate 
governance in South Africa contributes to the sustainable value creation.
30
 The objectives of 
King IV are to promote good corporate governance which will be accessible and fit to all kinds 
of organisations which vary by the sizes, resources and complexity of their strategic objectives 
and operations. The King IV is different from King III with regards to ‘apply or explain’ 
approach. It requires companies to use the ‘apply and explain’ approach as corporate governance 
principles applies to all kinds of organisations.
31
 King IV principles also apply to SMEs and the 
adaptation of these principles depends on the growth cycle, size, and complexity of the business. 
The supplements for the King IV report and its board structure are most relevant for the 
discussion of board structure of family owned companies in the next chapter, as they relatively 
start small.  
Corporate governance structures, codes and practices are essential for businesses in most 
countries. Corporate governance is no longer restricted to only apply to public listed companies 
but to all corporations.  Most countries, specifically the developing countries, should adopt 
corporate governance practices so as to attract investors from developed countries.
32
 The 
institutional investors need to be certain that the companies they want to invest in are financially 
sound and transparent, and will continue to be so in the future.
33
 
                                                          
28
 King IV Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (2016) 2. 
29
 King IV Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (2016) 2. 
30
 King IV Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (2016) 1 
31
 King IV Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (2016)  2 
32
 Rachagan S ‘Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance in Malaysia- Would the Self-Enforcing Model 
Protect Minority Shareholders’ (2007)3 Corporate Law Review 6. 
33
 Mallin AC Corporate Governance (2010) 45. 
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It is submitted that corporate governance should apply to all entities. However, corporations 
differ in size and structure; therefore, each company should apply corporate governance practices 
that best suit their corporation as King IV provide sector supplements for different kinds of 
organisations. It has been argued above that in order for companies to grow they need to attract 
institutional investors for funding specifically from the developed countries. For these investors 
to have interest in investing in a particular business, they will need to be assured that the business 
is financially sound through being transparent to the public. The published annual report should 
give all the detailed relevant information which will create a true picture of the position of the 
company.
34
 
 
2.3 DEFINITION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
It has been found that there is no set definition of corporate governance. This often means that 
people have an idea or know what corporate governance is but there is no accurate definition.
35
  
The UK Cadbury Report (1992) and the South African King Report (1994) define corporate 
governance as the ‘system by which companies are directed and controlled’.36 This definition 
implies that the responsibility of corporate governance to be practised rests with the board of 
directors of a company. 
According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), corporate 
governance is ‘a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. It also provides the structure through which the objectives 
of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance 
are determined’.37 This definition implies that corporate governance comprises the relationship 
between all the shareholders as well as the stakeholders of the company, working together to 
ensure that the goals and objectives of the company are met. 
Corporate governance can also be defined as: ‘The process of controlling management and 
balancing the interests of all the internal stakeholders and other parties (external stakeholders, 
                                                          
34
 King III Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (2009). 
35
 Du Plessis JJ, McConvil J & Bagaric M Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (2005) 1. 
36
 Du Plessis JJ et al Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (2005) 2. 
37
 OECD ‘Principles of corporate governance’ (OECD September 2015) available at 
www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate -Governance-Principles-ENG.pdf (accessed 22 November 2016). 
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governments and local communities) who can be affected by corporation’s conduct in order to 
ensure responsible behaviour by corporations and to achieve the maximum level of efficiency 
and profitability for a corporation’.38 This definition emphasizes the importance of taking into 
consideration the interest of all stakeholders and other related parties of the company. This 
means that the interest of all stakeholders should be taken into account. 
According to La Porta, corporate governance refers to ‘a set of mechanisms through which 
outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders’.39 This definition 
implies that the outside investors face risks when financing the firms as they might lose their 
investments; therefore corporate governance is there to protect the outside investors. Huse 
proposes four definitions of corporate governance. These four definitions are divided into four 
different groups, which are: Managerial definition, Shareholder Supremacy definition, 
Stakeholder definition, and Firm definition.
40
 
 
2.3.1. The Managerial definition 
The Managerial definition puts more emphasis on the management and internal actors of the 
company. The board members and external actors are known to be the instruments of 
management. The role (and accountability) of these board members is to serve the management. 
Therefore, according to the managerial perspective, corporate governance is used to design 
systems that can secure the interest and values of the management. The challenges that arise with 
the Managerial definition are its managerial values and objectives when they come into conflict 
with the values and objectives of other stakeholders.
41
 
 
2.3.2. The Shareholder Supremacy definition 
The Shareholder Supremacy definition became the leading corporate governance definition 
during the 1990s.
42
 The Shareholder definition puts more emphasis on the shareholders. The 
management and the board members are perceived to be the instruments of the shareholders. The 
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board is considered to be accountable to all the shareholders, through monitoring managerial 
opportunism and the potential exploitation of minority shareholders by majority shareholders. 
The Shareholder definition shows a separation between the ownership and leadership of the 
corporation.
43
 
 
2.3.3. The Stakeholder definition 
The Stakeholder definition is also called the Triangulation or Interaction definition. Corporate 
governance in this approach is perceived to be the outcome of interactions between multiple 
stakeholders. Corporate governance in this regard is defined as the relationship between 
stakeholders who are in the process of making decisions and exercising control over firm 
resources. The main actors are employees, customers, suppliers, creditors and the community.
44
 
 
2.3.4. The Firm definition 
The Firm definition puts more emphasis on the independence of the board. The main focus of 
corporate governance in the firm definition is to create value. The board members are required to 
do what is best for the company and act objectively and fairly when representing all 
stakeholders.  The board members are accountable to act in the best interest of the corporation 
and create a balance between the interests of internal and external actors. Therefore the purpose 
of corporate governance in this regard is to facilitate co-operation while resolving conflicts 
between stakeholders and monitoring control.
45
 
In comparing these definitions, the Managerial definition emphasises on what is best for the 
management. The Shareholder Supremacy definition emphasises on protecting shareholder 
value. The Stakeholder definition emphasises on the interaction between the relationships of all 
the relevant stakeholders. According to the Firm definition, its emphasis is on value creation by 
the board members.
46
 
In conclusion, the above definitions of corporate governance can be assumed to apply to big 
corporate companies which are listed on the JSE. However, the challenges that most companies 
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face in terms of growth forces many of them to apply corporate governance practices in order to 
exist for a long time.
47
 In sum, it can be concluded that corporate governance has no set 
definition as there are many definitions provided. However, this research will only focus on the 
definition of the OECD which states that corporate governance is ‘a set of relationships between 
a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. It also provides the 
structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring performance are determined’.  This definition is used to test whether 
good corporate governance plays a significant role in family owned businesses. Corporate 
governance does not only focus on its evolution and definition but also on the theories of the 
development of corporate governance. 
 
2.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
There are many theories that have influenced the development of corporate governance. Some of 
these theories include: Agency theory, Shareholders theory, Stakeholder theory and Stewardship 
theory.
48
 These theories are discussed as they generate the principles of corporate governance. 
2.4.1. Agency theory 
According to Mallin
49
, the role of the Agency theory is to identify the relationship between two 
parties where the owner of the company (principal) delegates the work to the manager (agent).
50
 
The Agency theory is concerned with resolving the challenges that may occur between the 
owners of the company and the management.
51
 This relationship may have many challenges as 
the manager of the company might not act in the best interest of the company.
52
 The Agency 
theory is against the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) being the chairperson of the same company 
as there will be conflict of interest. It argues that management will be more favoured while 
sacrificing the interests of owners.
53
 The perspective of this theory suggests that managing and 
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lowering the conflict between shareholders and managers is one of the main functions of a board 
of directors.
54
 
2.4.2. Shareholder Theory 
A shareholder is defined as the person who holds shares issued by a company.
55
 The rights of 
shareholders are protected by law in which the effectiveness of its protection differs by country. 
Shareholders have a vested interest in the company to ensure that the resources are used to 
maximise profits and benefit the society as a whole. The shareholders believe that they invested 
capital in the company therefore they are entitled to profits. 
56
 The operations of the company are 
dependent on the capital that shareholders provide to the company. Shareholders ensure that a 
company is managed efficiently as they have a vested interest in it.
57
 The shareholder theory 
states that the interests of the stakeholders of the company should be taken into consideration to 
an extent that it would be in the interest of shareholders as well.
58
 Therefore shareholders can 
also be viewed as stakeholders which is discussed next. 
2.4.3. Stakeholder theory 
The stakeholders in a corporation are the individuals and constituencies that contribute directly 
or indirectly to the company. Stakeholders are individuals who are affected by the activities of 
the business. They may have a direct or indirect interest in the corporation. They are divided into 
two groups: internal and external stakeholders. The internal stakeholders consist of shareholders 
and, employees and the external stakeholders consist of customers, creditors, suppliers, 
government and the community.
59
 Employees have a right to purchase shares in a company they 
work for. A stakeholder approach to corporate governance ensures that the interests of all the 
company stakeholders are looked at and taken care of, this creates trust between the company, 
internal and external stakeholders.
60
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2.4.3.1 Shareholders 
Companies raise capital in the market by issuing shares to the public. Shareholders are people 
who invest in a company by purchasing its shares. The main focus of shareholders is return on 
investment. Shareholders are stakeholders in a corporation as they have a vested interest in the 
business; however, stakeholders are not always shareholders. The emphasis of shareholders is on 
profitability over responsibility
61
 
2.4.3.2. Employees 
Employees are a big part of a company as they spend most of their daily lives working in it and 
benefitting as well in terms of their livelihood. A company cannot operate without employees 
and therefore they need to be treated with care and respect. A company should ensure that the 
interests of its employees are well taken care of. In some instances, employees are offered an 
opportunity to buy and own shares in a company. This is a good strategy to make employees feel 
part of the company which will result in productivity and loyalty. Companies should have all the 
proper procedures so as to ensure that should there be any inappropriate misconduct then the 
employees can feel free to report on them.
62
  
2.4.3.3. Customers 
Customers are very important to a company. They need to feel part of the company. The 
company should build a relationship with its customers so as to have loyal customers who would 
not purchase the same product from other companies. Therefore a good and healthy relationship 
between a company and its customers is essential. Furthermore, customers should be aware of 
the ethical and social aspects of a company’s behaviour so as to ensure that it is socially 
responsible.
63
 
2.4.3.4. Creditors 
Most companies borrow money for their start-ups from banks and financial institutions. 
Therefore it is in the best interest of a company to maintain the confidence of finance 
providers.
64
 It is submitted that a company should always have a good credit reputation. 
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2.4.3.5. Suppliers 
Suppliers are interested in the sustainability and continuance of a company as they will wish to 
have a long-term outlet for their goods and services. Therefore, suppliers retain an interest in the 
company in order to be certain they will be paid at an agreed time. If a company is going through 
cash flow problems the suppliers also become alarmed since they get their money from the 
company. Suppliers build a long term relationship with the company to ensure that they are the 
only suppliers of the company. Suppliers become concerned when a company is not performing 
well as they wish for it to exist for a long time.
65
 
2.4.3.6. Government 
The government has an interest in the company as it ensures that the company acts in a socially 
responsible way. It ensures that the social, ethical and environmental factors are taken into 
account. The government does not only show interest in social factors but also market supply of 
and demand for goods and services.
66
 
2.4.3.7. Community 
A community ensures that companies in the area act in an environmentally friendly way so as to 
avoid pollution of soil and the local environment. A community shows interest in the long term 
sustainability of a company by local employees making sure that it operates in an efficient 
manner which will benefit the community.
67
 
2.4.4. Stewardship theory 
The purpose of this theory is not about maximising wealth of the corporation but serving a social 
purpose. This theory motivates that everyone in society needs to be involved in the governance 
of a corporation. Stakeholders are encouraged to be part of a company’s governance as that will 
lead to more effectiveness and productivity.
68
 Stewardship theory argues that the roles of CEO 
and Chairman be unified and held by the same person. This theory believes that the CEO should 
have complete authority over the corporation so as to avoid confusion and doubt as to who has 
the responsibility for a certain matter. This theory motivates that a corporation will be more 
effective and able to produce superior returns should the roles of CEO and Chairman be 
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unified.
69
 It is found that the board of directors and the CEO should always act in the best 
interest of the company and not in their own interests. 
It is submitted that the Agency theory contradicts the Stewardship theory with regard to the 
CEO’s and Chairman positions. It has been argued above that the Agency theory separates the 
role of the CEO from that of Chairman; however, the Stewardship theory supports that the roles 
of CEO and Chairman be unified. Therefore there is a contradiction between these two theories 
of corporate governance. For the purpose of this research, the Stakeholder theory is most 
appropriate and an important characteristic of corporate governance and is used for the 
discussion on corporate governance, as it does not only focus on one aspect of corporate 
governance but covers the theories related to both the shareholders and the stakeholders of a 
company. 
 
2.5. CHARACTERISTICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Corporate governance has important characteristics that companies should always apply in order 
to grow and be transparent to the public. These characteristics include discipline, transparency, 
independence, accountability, responsibility, fairness, and social responsibility.
70
 
2.5.1. Discipline 
Corporate discipline requires the senior management of a company to behave in a recognised and 
accepted manner. The emphasis is on the senior management to comply with the principles of 
good governance.
71
 
2.5.2. Transparency 
Corporate transparency requires the management of a company to make sure the necessary 
information is accurate and available to the shareholders and other stakeholders. The investors 
should get a clear picture of what is happening inside the company. The company should be 
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transparent as regards to its actions, economic fundamentals and financial and non-financial 
aspects relevant to the business.
72
 
2.5.3. Independence 
It has been found that in all corporations there will always be conflicts. Therefore, corporate 
independence provides mechanisms which will minimise or avoid potential conflicts which may 
exist. These mechanisms provide for the composition of the board, the committees of the board 
and other external parties, such as auditors.
73
 
2.5.4. Accountability 
An individual or a group of people that makes decisions for a company and take action on issues 
pertaining to them are known to be accountable to the company. The mechanisms for 
accountability need to be effective so as to provide investors with all the information they might 
need to assess the actions of the board and its committees.
74
 
2.5.5. Responsibility 
Corporate responsibility is the process that allows for (corrective) action towards all 
stakeholders. The management of a company needs to put in place certain measures that would 
set the company in the right direction. The board of a company needs to be accountable and act 
responsibly towards the stakeholders of the company.
75
 
2.5.6. Fairness 
Corporate fairness refers to a company’s systems which involves taking into account the interests 
of both shareholders and stakeholders. The interests of these groups need to be respected and 
acknowledged at all times. The minority shareholders should not be treated any lesser than the 
majority shareholders. There should always be fairness within the company.
76
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2.5.7. Social responsibility 
Corporate social responsibility refers to a company being aware of social issues and responding 
to them in accordance with ethical standards. A company that is a good citizen in the community 
is likely to benefit through a good corporate reputation.
77
 
2.5.8. IT governance  
Information systems are built into the strategy of the business. There are risks which come about 
with information technology and are essential in the business. These risks include the operational 
risks which are connected with service providers due to information that leaves the company. In 
IT governance, a company seeks confidentiality, integrity and availability of the functioning of 
the system. The authenticity, possession and the assurance that the system is useful is pursued in 
IT governance. The unauthorised use of the system and the changes to it become a concern to the 
company. The steps by the company need to be taken into consideration in ensuring that 
information technology operates smoothly in an ethical manner.
78
   
2.5.9. Risk Management 
In any type of business risk for reward is involved. Risks are undetermined as they can occur any 
time in a business and could impact on the achievements of the company’s objectives. A risk is 
sometimes taken by a company to pursue an opportunity and in such cases a company should 
have strategies in place to mitigate risks which may occur. Risk management is the process of 
identifying and analysing the risk of the business and further take necessary steps to manage it. 
Risk management may imply mitigating the risk or eliminating it completely. Risk management 
is essential in all types of companies with different sizes and complexity. Risk management is 
vital in small companies as they are likely to fail.
79
 It is submitted that family owned companies 
need to apply risk management policies as they are in a position to fail and miss opportunities. 
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2.5.10. Ethical Leadership 
The foundation for corporate governance is ethics (integrity and responsibility). Good corporate 
governance calls for integrity, transparency and accountability which is essentially about 
effective and responsible leadership. A leader in a company needs to first define the strategy, 
provide the direction and achieve sustainable performance. The board is required to ensure that 
the company is run ethically and with integrity. When this is done, the company earns an 
approval to operate from those who are affected by the operation.
80
 
 
These characteristics are the most important factors of corporate governance. Investor confidence 
is achieved through the use of these characteristics. Transparency and disclosure are found to be 
the most important characteristics of corporate governance as the information needs of investors 
and other interest groups of businesses increase.  These two main characteristics serve a bridging 
role between companies and the public.  A company which practises these characteristics stands 
a better chance of sustainability and this further leads to the benefits discussed below. 
2.6. BENEFITS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Corporate governance is an important tool to be adopted and used by companies. However, it 
does not have a ‘one size fits all’ approach. Companies differ in many different aspects, 
including size and structure. Therefore some of the mechanisms of a company’s corporate 
governance may not be fit to be implemented by other companies. However King IV provides 
supplements for different organisations as a guideline on how they should exercise good 
corporate governance. Therefore; a company needs to set down the mechanisms and practices of 
corporate governance which best suit it.
81
 Corporate governance is important to be adopted and 
established as it impacts positively on the company’s growth due to the principles, policies, 
guidelines, and practices that are set out to help companies in the right direction. It changes the 
attitude of the people who are in the business. The business gets taken seriously. It further 
changes the responsibility of directors in the board. The directors have a responsibility to 
shareholders and stakeholders of the company. Corporate governance contributes to the success 
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of the business by ensuring that sound decisions are made that will benefit the business with 
regards to returns and reduce the risks.
82
 
 
2.6.1. Reduction of Fraud and Corporate Collapse 
In recent years there have been an increasing number of company collapses due to fraud, scams 
and corrupt practices.
83
 These corporate collapses have had many effects on shareholders, 
employees, suppliers as well as local and international communities. Corporate governance is 
good for companies to practise. Fraud and company collapse tend to be reduced in companies 
that practise good corporate governance.
84
 Corporate governance guides companies to conduct 
the affairs of the business with integrity and honesty.
85
 
2.6.2. Creation of Wealth and Improved Performance 
Good corporate governance can increase wealth by improving the performance of honestly 
managed and financially sound companies.
86
 Companies that practise good corporate governance 
gain added value through making institutional investors pay a premium for their shares as they 
are well aware of their interests being taken into account.
87
 Therefore, companies with good 
corporate governance structures tend to attract investors. 
2.6.3. Protection of Shareholders and Stakeholders 
Corporate governance caters for the shareholders and other stakeholders of the company. It 
provides mechanisms that ensure that the interests of all the internal stakeholders and other 
parties who are part of the corporation are taken care of. The board of directors has to protect the 
interests of all the shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers and local communities. 
Protection of shareholders and stakeholders will lead to employee productivity.
88
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2.6.4. Improves efficiency 
Corporate governance has the ability to change the ownership structure of a company. Corporate 
governance puts pressure on the management of the company to be more efficient, transparent 
and accountable. The management has the duty to protect social groups and the environment.
89
 
2.6.5. Increased access to financing 
Another reason for the importance of corporate governance is the increased access to financing. 
Increased access to financing can lead to larger investment, higher growth and creation of 
employment. Research shows that there is a relationship between corporate governance and 
access to financial services. Good corporate governance leads to a better developed financial 
system which is associated with small and medium enterprises.
90
 It is submitted that corporate 
governance is important as it provides opportunities for financing. Corporate governance 
includes policies and structures which make companies transparent while protecting the rights of 
shareholders and stakeholders. A company that is transparent makes it easier for financial 
institutions to finance it. 
2.6.6. Higher firm valuation and better operational performance 
In addition to the arguments above, corporate governance practices do not only affect access to 
funding but also the firm’s valuation and operational performance. Outsiders are more resistant 
to provide finance to companies where corporate governance practices are not implemented. 
Furthermore, the outsiders will also charge higher rates if they are not assured that they will get 
an adequate rate of return.
91
 Corporations who do not practise corporate governance are more 
likely to have conflicts with regard to cash flow and voting rights. With good corporate 
governance a firm’s performance is improved through more efficient management, better asset 
allocation, labour policies and any other efficiency improvements. Therefore, good operational 
performance which is done by allocation of resources and good management creates wealth.
92
 
                                                          
89
 Rachagan S ‘(2007) 34 
90
Clasessens SP & Yurtoglu B ‘Corporate Governance & Development- An Update (2012) International France 
Corporation’ 20. 
91
 Claessens S Corporate Governance and Development (2006) 21 The World Bank Research Observer 102. 
92
 Claessens SP & Yurtoglu B ‘Corporate Governance & Development- An Update (2012)  International France 
Corporation’ 20 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
2.6.7. Better relations with other stakeholders 
Public and private corporations have relevant stakeholders that play an important role in the 
corporations. These include banks, bondholders, and local and national governments. These 
stakeholders play significant roles within a corporation which include monitoring, motivating 
and ensuring discipline. As it has been discussed, stakeholders hold a very important position in 
a firm and corporate governance includes policies which protects the rights of stakeholders. A 
firm cannot operate without them. When the employees are being treated fairly, the company 
benefits as well, through more output being produced by employees. It is submitted that 
corporate governance improves labour relations issues which helps both the corporation and the 
stakeholders.
93
 Workers will be treated fairly which will result in more work being done and will 
also attract investors, as they will be happy with the quality of work being done by stakeholders. 
A firm’s financial performance can be improved through a high degree of corporate 
responsibility in relation to all the stakeholders of the firm. Determining the responsiveness of a 
company to its stakeholders is not easy; therefore, the effectiveness of stakeholder management 
depends on the company’s transparency and its reputation to the industry.94 
Good corporate governance assists the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the 
interest of the organization and its stakeholders, facilitates effective monitoring, and encourages 
the organization to use its resources more efficiently. Corporate governance is important because 
it makes good business sense.
95
 
The role of the board is to delegate certain functions to board committees, however the board 
should not abandon its own duties and responsibility. Formal terms of reference should be put in 
place for these committees. It has been found that corporate governance consists of rules, 
principles and practices that determine the management and control of a company.
96
 The 
distribution of power between the shareholders and management of a company is covered under 
the wing of corporate governance. Corporate governance provides rules and guidelines on the 
operation of a board of directors, and their duties and responsibility in a company. Good 
corporate governance provides a balance between the performances of the company while 
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preventing risks of corporate collapse. Good corporate governance promotes the value of 
transparency of the company as well as ensuring that the interests of both the shareholders and 
stakeholders are respected and taken into account. Therefore corporate governance is a stability 
factor for companies in terms of social, political and favourable investments.
97
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
It has been found that corporate governance has no set definition. However it is vital for 
companies to use corporate governance as it provides policies and practices that guide companies 
in the right direction. There has been an issue with corporate scandals and collapses for which a 
lack of corporate governance could be the driving force. Corporate governance regulation in SA 
consists of the King Reports and the Companies Act 2008 which serve as guidelines for 
companies’ boards of directors. Corporate governance provides characteristics which ensure that 
transparency, accountability, honesty and integrity are practised in companies. Good corporate 
governance can contribute to the growth and stability of a corporation. The development of 
corporate governance has been driven by the need to restore investor confidence. 
Corporate governance is there to ensure that boards of directors are more accountable, the 
directors play their key role, and that committees are able to operate effectively. Corporate 
governance comprises definitions, policies and theories which are set out as guidelines in order 
to help with the sustainability and growth of companies. There is a great link between corporate 
governance principles, and guidelines and their characteristics and the failure of family owned 
companies. For the purpose of this report the Stakeholder theory and OECD definition of 
corporate governance is used as the ideal for corporate governance and for effective management 
of family owned companies. This mini thesis in the next chapter, is examining the main critical 
issues faced by family-owned firms. The challenges faced by family-owned firms are discussed 
as well as the advantages of having a formal governance structure in a family-owned firm. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CHALLENGES OF FAMILY OWNED COMPANIES AND BOARD COMPOSITION 
STRUCTURE 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
It has been established that the global economy is well built on family owned firms. The majority 
of largest multinational companies started as family owned firms and more than 50% of the 
businesses in the world can be defined as family firms both in developed and emerging 
markets.
98
 Family dimensions, family characteristics and family involvement constitute the 
definition of family businesses.
99
 Family businesses are pursued by a family member or few 
family members in order to fulfil their vision and for the company to be sustainable through 
generations. Therefore it can be concluded that a family business is a type of business operation 
where a group of related people come together and have an interest in the corporation.
100
 A 
personal relationship between family members and non- family members is one of the important 
issues that ensures the survival of the company. Family and non-family members need to nurture 
their relationship for the continued growth of the business. Although family owned companies 
are known to have achieved greater outcomes than non-family companies, there are challenges 
that arise among the stakeholders in the company.
101
 
This chapter seeks to provide an analysis of the family business context, life cycle of a family 
owned company, board composition and ownership structure. The main critical challenges facing 
family owned companies are discussed as they affect the survival of the company. A conclusion 
and recommendations are given based on the information gathered to show family companies 
could improve their strength and weaknesses. This chapter primarily focuses on medium to large 
family owned companies that require corporate governance.  
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3.2 FAMILY BUSINESS CONTEXT 
Families go into business for many different reasons. For some it could be planned, unintended 
and coincidental. Other family members get an idea of going into business after they have retired 
from their jobs in order to provide a source of income, avoid starvation and poverty. Other 
family members grow existing family companies in order to continue the legacy of the past 
generation. Some start a family business having a desire to create financial stability. All these 
reasons for starting a family company might either lead to company success and growth or 
failure in the business.
102
 Family owned companies provide an essential co-operation between 
parents, siblings and other related family members in assisting one another for the success of the 
business. For the continuing success of the business there has to be smooth interpersonal 
communication and the relationships between the family members need to provide a good 
foundation for communicating openly. In order for smooth operation of the business there has to 
be a level of trust between shareholders and employees; therefore one of the advantages of 
having a family business is trust between family members. In a family owned company, there are 
stages that occur throughout the existence of the company which will help with a better 
understanding of the functioning of the company as well as its strengths and weaknesses.
103
 For 
this reason, the life cycle of a family owned company is explained. 
3.3 LIFE CYCLE OF A FAMILY OWNED COMPANY 
It is a standard norm that each family has its own history, rules, values and unique ways of doing 
things. The structure of the business changes as the family expands, particularly with the 
participation of the second and third generations. The changes in the business can impact 
negatively or positively on the business depending on the governance structures in place adopted 
by the company.
104
 The family life cycle consists of three generation stages. 
In the first generation, there are few individuals who are owners and shareholders. These 
shareholders are members of the board of directors and team managers of the company. This 
approach encourages simplicity in the business. However, if there is no distinction between the 
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owners and managers, third parties might find it difficult to have confidence in the company.
105
 
The first stage is sometimes called the founder controlling owner stage. This is the first stage in 
the existence of the family business. The company is managed by the founder/owner. The 
founders in this stage might ask for advice from other business associates but the majority of 
decisions are taken by the founder. Corporate governance issues are very limited in this stage as 
the ownership and control still lie with the founder. The most important issue is succession 
planning as the founder needs to groom the next leader of the company so that the company can 
survive from generation to generation.
106
 
The second stage is sometimes called the sibling partnership stage. This is when the ownership 
of the business is being transferred to the children of the founder. The founder is no longer the 
owner/manager. There is no simplicity in this stage, things become complex and corporate 
governance is required. There are challenges that are faced by siblings in terms of harmony, 
formalising processes and procedures, efficient communication channels and succession 
planning for management positions.
107
 The ownership has been transferred by the founder and 
not everyone who is part of the ownership has the same interest in the company. In most cases 
the siblings develop different views about the business which might lead to potential conflicts.
108
 
The third stage is sometimes referred to as the cousin confederation stage. In this stage, most 
family members (directly and indirectly) are involved and the running of the business becomes 
complex. These family members have different views on how the business should be run. The 
conflicts become more complex in this stage as siblings and cousins have different views on the 
operation of the company. The challenges that family companies face at this stage consist of 
family member’s role in the business, family conflict resolution, family shareholding rights, 
shareholding liquidity and family vision and mission.
109
 The business requires a high degree of 
professionalism. In this stage there is a huge need for outside management and corporate 
governance practices. 
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Each of these stages present different issues and challenges; however, they need to be managed 
properly in order to ensure continuity in the business. It has been found that most family owned 
companies are successful during the first stage as the decisions are taken by the founder of the 
company. In the long run the corporate governance structures and mechanisms need to be put in 
place in order to allow for efficient communication and clear definition of roles in the family 
company as it is important in the economy.
110
 
3.4 BOARD COMPOSITION STRUCTURE OF A FAMILY OWNED COMPANY 
The board of directors is one of the important mechanisms in a family owned company. The 
research on board of directors mainly focuses on medium to large family owned companies.
111
 
Boards of directors bring advice and expertise to the company; therefore, the company needs 
them in order to minimise potential conflict.
112
 The role of a board of directors differs from the 
medium sized and unlisted companies with regards to the presence of the owners managing the 
company. There is a formal link that a board of directors provides between the owners and the 
managers who are responsible for the running of the day- to- day business. The board is known 
as the head of the firm’s decision control system.113 Shareholders in a company are not in good 
position to effectively control the managers; therefore they install an independent board of 
directors which are outside members.
114
 
3.4.1 Non-Family Members 
It has been argued that a solid board structure of a family company should include non-family 
members as they are in a position to better see opportunities and pitfalls for the company than 
family members.
115
 Non-family members refer to people who are involved in the business 
through offering their skills and expertise. Non-family members include outside professionals, 
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experts, advisors, and consultants who offer an extra dimension of competence, experience and 
objectivity to issues affecting both the family and the business. There is a considerable role that 
non-family members play in the business as they maintain positive relationships between family 
members as well as avoiding conflict between family members. These non- family members 
perform these duties in order to achieve long- term growth of the company. Non-family members 
provide new ideas for the company and are in a better position to take advantage of external 
skills which might help the company be able to grow and successfully respond well to change.
116
 
3.4.2 The Role of the Board of Directors 
According to Young et al
117
 members of the board of directors have a role to ensure that agency 
costs in a company are reduced. Furthermore, the board structure may have an influence on the 
strategic choices of a company and plays a significant role in the decision making process. Most 
family owned companies determine their board structure by having family members as the 
executives so that they can keep their legacy within the family.
118
A family controlled firm has a 
more centralized decision making system.
119
 Medium to large family owned companies have a 
majority of family members on the board of directors.
120
 The role of these board members is to 
advise and supervise within the company as follow:
121
 
 Board members ensure that the assets and resources are used properly. 
 The responsibility to hire and fire the CEO lies with the board members 
 The development of long-term strategies and their approval depends on the board of 
directors 
 Board of directors protect the interests of the shareholders. 
 The board oversees the participation of the family within the business. 
 The big corporate decisions of a company are taken by the board 
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 The board is very critical where the succession is concerned. 
 The management should be asked challenging questions by the board. 
 The co-ordination between directors and the CEO must be done through the human 
resources department to ensure a fair and reasonable selection process. 
 The board of directors should develop a succession plan in order to prevent the founder 
of the company from overly extending their term of office or delaying their retirement. 
According to Carlo
122
, most of the independent directors in family owned companies are CEOs 
of other large institutions, deans and professors at Universities or professionally trained 
individuals.
123
 Therefore an independent board of the company comprises non- family members. 
An independent board of directors should not be part of family quarrels; however, they should 
help by overcoming any arising challenges. The board should structure a communication process 
between rival family members.
124
 
Family owned firms strive to be the best as compared to their competitors. The need for a 
professional approach is as important in family owned firms than in non-family firms. They need 
to prepare for the survival of the firm by establishing governance structures. The strength of a 
family owned company come from the values of the founder which gives a clear identity in an 
increasingly corporate world.
125
 
The above discussion of the board structure of family owned businesses has been said to apply to 
medium and large family owned companies. Recently King IV has been developed and contains 
sectoral supplement for SME’s, which is the level the majority of family businesses relatively 
start at. The King IV SME supplement proposes a board structure that family owned companies 
should follow and is discussed next. 
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3.5 BOARD STRUCTURE FOR SME’S 
According to the SME supplement board structure of the King IV report, businesses should 
exercise independence in their board structure for the interest of the company. These businesses 
should have an experienced non- executive director to serve on the board. In a case where a 
company does not have enough resources to have a full time non-executive director, they should 
invite an ad hoc director to sit in the meetings so as to get an inside understanding of the business 
and be objective when making decisions until a company is able to have a full time non-
executive director. As the company grows in its capacity, the board should increase the number 
of non-executive board directors.
126
 Independent non-executive members need to be appointed 
by the board in order to provide leadership to the business. In a case where a chair is not a non- 
executive member, a lead independent non-executive director needs to be appointed as to avoid 
conflict of interests. The roles of the CEO and Chairman should be separated as the CEO cannot 
be the chairman of the board. The roles and functions of the chair should be stated in writing and 
be documented.
127
 The directors who do not have the skills or experience should undergo 
corporate governance training in order to develop the necessary skills and fulfil their fiduciary 
duties. A formal process should be followed for the appointment of non-executive members of 
the board of directors and the obligations of each member should be agreed upfront. To have a 
mixture of executive directors, non-executive directors and independent members in the board 
helps with mitigating the risks of taking decisions with emotions specifically in family owned 
companies where the  family members are resistant to change the authority of the founder.
128
 
Furthermore full disclosure of each individual should be made so that the shareholders can make 
their own assessment of the proposed directors. 
According to the resources and capacity of SME, It is not necessary for the board to have 
committees as recommended by the principle. Therefore; it is the duty of the board to fulfil any 
duties of the board committee which the company lacks. Separate meetings can be held for the 
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roles of absent board committees in order for the board to focus on specific topic which was the 
role of the absent committee. 
129
 
There are certain factors to be taken into consideration when determining the number of 
members in the board which include the nature and needs of the business. There should be a 
mixture of executives, non-executive and independent members in the board. Members should 
have a collective of skills, knowledge, and experience.
130
 
It is submitted that the development of King IV can assist in the survival of family owned 
businesses in South Africa as it is the first regulation to accommodate family owned companies 
and requires businesses to use the ‘apply and explain’ approach. However King IV has just been 
published recently and therefore there is no guarantee that this report will be effective and make 
any significant contribution to the survival of the family owned companies in South Africa. 
A board needs to be established by successful family owned firms. The family involvement is 
important through dedicated channels such as a family council. The board is very essential in 
family owned businesses as it ensures the stability in the firm and its values are achieved. The 
board helps in properly managing strategic issues of the company. 
131
 
The outside directors contribute the success of the firm as they bring new ideas and experiences 
into the company. They assist with the internal issues of the company ensuring that there is equal 
treatment between family and non-family executives.
132
 
3.6 FAMILY-OWNED FIRMS AND GOVERNANCE 
The majority of family owned firms start relatively small and family members are able to 
manage and direct the company. The agency problem is rare in a family firm due to ownership 
and control being one instead of being split, therefore the problems of opportunistic behavior are 
lessened. A family owned firm is at an advantage of having the ability to be less driven by the 
short term demands of the market.
133
 They are more flexible as to when and how they want to 
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make profit. As much as family owned firms start small, there may be tension and division 
among family members as each person will want to take action in the business which will result 
in affecting the day to day operations of the business and the long term development of the 
company. The siblings and different generations might argue about how the business should be 
and who should hold which position. Therefore the need to have a family forum is vital where 
each member express their views and the development of the business is discussed. As the 
business expands and more family members join the business, the establishment of a family 
council is advisable. When the business expands and the relationships amongst family members 
affect the effectiveness of the business operation then the need to develop a more formal 
governance structure is desirable. The advisory board in a family firm may also come into play; 
however, it does not provide the same benefits as the defined board structure with independent 
directors and non-executive directors.
134
 
According to the Cadbury report, establishing a board of directors in a family owned company 
means progressing from an organization based on family relationships to one that is based 
primarily on business relationship. The business in this stage is no longer managed informal; the 
process for taking decisions and responsibilities is clearly defined.
135
 
 
3.6.1 Advantages Of a Formal Governance Structure in a Family Owned Company. 
A formal governance structure contributes positively in a family owned company. It has certain 
advantages which will be discussed below:
136
 
 Corporate governance requires family owned companies to have a defined structure with 
defined channels for decision making and clear lines of responsibility. 
 The sensitive areas may be tackled by the board from a family view point but nonetheless 
need to be dealt with, such as succession planning (deciding who will fill the key roles in 
the business should the existing incumbents move on, die or retire). The shareholders also 
like to know the succession plan of the firm. 
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 The directors should be appointed on the basis of their knowledge and their experience 
that they can bring to the family firm.  A good governance system will help the family 
company achieve its objectives. 
 Family companies with good governance structures and views from non-family members 
will be in a better position to grow in the future. 
 Family owned companies with sound corporate governance tend to encourage both 
transparency and accountability which investors are increasingly looking for in both 
corporate management and corporate performance. 
 The advantages of a formal governance structure include defined channels for decision 
making and clear lines of responsibility. The sensitive areas from a family view point can 
be tackled objectively through succession planning. 
 A company with good corporate governance is more likely to attract external capital 
flows than one without. 
 A family owned company can benefit from having a good governance structure that will 
keep the business focused and be able to take views from outsiders that are non-family 
members so that it can be in a better position to evolve and grow in the future. 
It is submitted that having a formal corporate governance structure has a positive contribution to 
organisations specifically family owned companies. Lack of corporate governance tends to 
weaken the company. Access to capital can be easily accessible as investors use their resources 
and contacts for financial support. A formal governance structure can help a company improve 
its performance through important decisions which may involve the quality of decisions and the 
goals of the business. The talents and skills of directors can be utilised effectively as members of 
the company have the required qualifications. 
 
3.7 CHALLENGES OF FAMILY OWNED COMPANIES 
Family businesses are inclined to face serious challenges that affect the survival of the company.  
Many of these challenges arise between family members and relate to family values of the 
company. These challenges include: 
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3.7.1 Decisions not Beneficial to the Company 
Family owned businesses may not always maximise the welfare of all the stakeholders involved 
in the company. The decisions that may be taken may not always be for the benefit of the 
business. In some cases the controlling family members might give jobs to their children while 
they do not deserve to be part of it. The financial needs of the family might force the family to 
make the decisions which are not in the best interest of the company so as to maintain their 
financial status. Family members might keep an unproductive family member on the payroll of 
the company simply because they are part of the family; further entering into a lease agreement 
for a building that is owned by a family member and having suppliers which are from within a 
family and buying the products at uncompetitive prices.
137
 
3.7.2 Informal Decision Making in a Family Owned Company 
 The decisions made in family owned businesses may not be as organised as that of public 
companies. In a public company, decisions are taken formally unlike in a family owned company 
where they can take decisions in an informal way which can further disrupt the survival of the 
company. Furthermore, family members who provide input might have different goals to that of 
the company. The decisions in the family might be taken for the interest of the related parties and 
not the company. For instance, the boardroom becomes a forum for acting out deep rooted 
family conflicts which is caused by tension they had since childhood.
138
 
3.7.3 Concentration of Ownership 
The ownership of a family owned company is concentrated and privately held therefore it is 
difficult for an unhappy family member to escape from the company and sell its shares. In a 
public company members who are unhappy sell their shares and exit the company. Therefore, 
family members who are unhappy and wishes to exit the company place it at risk of failing as it 
will be difficult to raise cash. The unhappy family member will force the operating members to 
borrow money in order to purchase the shares; this puts a company’s continued viability at 
risk.
139
 
 
                                                          
137
 Tannenbaum DF & Ratner LP ‘All in the Family: Corporate Governance Issues Facing Family-Owned Businesses’ 
(2002) 2 
138
 Tannenbaum DF & Ratner LP (2002)  2. 
139
Ernesto J Family Businesses (2014) 96 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
3.7.4 Succession Planning 
The succession planning in a family owned company is not always based on merit. The founder 
of the company might be a genius and the company be known through that. The next generation 
might not have the same drive, vision and passion as that of the founder. Moreover, the next 
generation may want to prove themselves or be motivated by fear. The outside investors might 
lose confidence in the company when the founder retires and next generation takes over.
140
 
Furthermore; the majority of family companies are relatively inactive when it comes to 
succession planning. The founders of the company are often uncomfortable to talk about 
succession. However; succession planning has a positive effect in ensuring that a future leader 
with much needed experience is considered and additional training is provided.
141
 
3.7.5 Resistance to Change 
Most family businesses are resistant to change as they believe that things should be done the 
same way as their parents did before.  These family members believe that certain practices 
worked best when their parents were in charge; therefore there is no need for change.
142
 It can be 
submitted that family members might resist changing the way things are done in the business 
especially if the change comes from non-family members. 
3.7.6 Raising Capital 
There is a wide range of capital available for public businesses; however, the opportunities of 
raising funds for family owned companies are limited. Family businesses find it difficult to raise 
capital from outside sources as they fear loss of control. They believe that outsiders will acquire 
influence over how the business is run.
143
 It can be submitted that family members are hesitant to 
look for funding from outside as they want to keep the business within the family; therefore, are 
scared that outside funding might risk them losing control of the business. 
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3.7.7. Nepotism and Family Member Issues 
The issue of nepotism and selfishness between family members tend to harm the long term 
operation and efficiency of family owned companies.
144
 There may be tensions and divisions 
among the family members who may take different courses of action that will affect the day- to- 
day activities in the way in which the business operates, and its long term development. Family 
owned companies are not governed as effectively and efficiently as non-family owned 
companies First, family companies face the difficulties of having to deal with family members 
who want to become part of the company while they have no qualification or experience in the 
industry. In most cases unqualified family members are asked to participate in positions which 
exceed their skills and level of experience, while there is someone with the skills to fill up the 
position.
145
 Secondly, managers in a family company do not act in the best interests of outside 
members as they are supposed to. Thirdly different generations of the family might have 
different views on how the company should be run.
146
 The family members might argue about 
various things, eg who should hold which position, and these differences might impact 
negatively on the running of the company. It has been argued that ownership of a family owned 
company tends to have a higher level of trust which leads to less monitoring of management 
activity. The managers in a family owned company may act for the controlling family rather than 
the stakeholders in general. 
147
 
3.8 IMPORTANCE OF FAMILY OWNED COMPANIES IN THE ECONOMY 
Family owned companies are important in the economy because they offer powerful 
opportunities for economic and social empowerment. It has been found that these companies 
create jobs and wealth more efficiently than non-family companies, and are less likely to lay 
people off.
148
 Furthermore, they provide a better rate of return on investments. It has been found 
that during the period 1987 to 1992, family companies that were listed on the JSE recorded an 
overall rate of 36% growth. In comparison, non-family companies returned a rate of 27 per cent 
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growth.
149
 The statistics are evidence that family companies show more growth than non-family 
companies. Many companies believe that as the business grows, it will require financial 
assistance from outside investors in order to pursue its expansion; therefore, outside investors 
will only invest if they know that their rights and interests are protected both in the context of 
corporate governance as well as the legal framework of the country. It is found that the majority 
of investors would be prepared to pay a premium to invest in a company with good corporate 
governance.
150
 Family owned firms are more likely to give out to charity organisations in their 
respective communities and hardly get into debt.
151
 
Family owned companies run their businesses the way they see fit which can be detrimental to 
the success and survival of the company. These challenges that have been discussed are the 
causes of non- continued existence of family owned companies to the second and third 
generation. Good governance in family owned companies can have a positive effect on the 
business as there are many challenges. Good governance contributes to the most challenging 
issues of the business through the board of directors using their expertise. Having a stronger 
governance and succession strategy helps in persevering the long term vision of the founder and 
many generations. Family owned businesses have so many challenges for them to deal with in 
order to succeed in the market. There are always competing priorities for any business therefore 
every company should ask themselves how much value can they create if good governance and 
succession planning is a priority to their company. Moreover; good corporate governance in 
family owned business makes investors and non-family employees gain more trust from 
shareholders.
152
 
3.9 CONCLUSION 
Family owned companies do not have a general definition; however, they are firms run by a 
majority of family members. A personal relationship between family and non-family members is 
one of the contributing factors to the growth of the company. As the family keeps growing and 
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being part of the company, the family starts experiencing challenges in reaching sound decisions 
which will affect the growth and survival of the company. The corporate governance structure 
can help the company develop successfully and provide means for accountability that would 
enable the family to benefit from the contribution of independent non-executive directors, and 
help to ensure a more transparent and fair approach in the way the business is organized and 
managed.  Corporate governance is of high importance to family owned firms. The structures of 
corporate governance contribute to the development of the firm. Family owned firms are able to 
benefit from the contribution of independent non-executive directors and a more transparent and 
fair approach is the way forward for the business. A family company that complies with the King 
codes set by the King Committee is in a better position to grow. Family companies are the ones 
that mostly need corporate governance as they often do not survive to the next generation. A 
family company needs to have a good board structure where there will be executive and non- 
executive members who are not part of the family as they will make sound decisions that will 
benefit the company as a whole and not only specific members who are part of the family. 
Therefore a solid governance structure is required in a family company. 
Corporate governance in developing countries needs to be explored so as to get an in-depth 
understanding of how other countries practise governance in family owned companies. For this 
reason the next chapter compares the board structure of corporate governance in South Africa 
and Brazil with regards to family owned companies as well as take recommendations from 
corporate governance in the US. 
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CHAPTER 4 
COMPARISON OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA AND BRAZIL 
SPECIFICALLY IN BOARD COMPOSITION STRUCTURE OF FAMILY OWNED 
COMPANIES. 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The term ‘corporate governance’ can be defined in very broad terms.153 Corporate governance 
has been defined as the relationship between the board of the company, management, 
shareholders and stakeholders. Corporate governance places structures in place which were 
developed to attain the objectives of the company as well as monitoring its performance.
154
 This 
chapter compares two developing countries, namely South Africa (SA) and Brazil with regards 
to their corporate governance developments. These countries are diverse in their board structure 
and corporate governance principles. A comparison of the board composition structure between 
these countries is explained. Furthermore, recommendations from a developed country such as 
the United States are discussed, including how it exercises corporate governance specifically 
with regard to family-owned companies. The recommendations from the United States are used 
as it is a country with a majority of successful family owned companies. This chapter first 
analyses the state of family owned businesses in SA as well as legislation which consist of 
principles and practices to guide these family owned companies for their survival.  
 
4.2 FAMILY OWNED COMPANIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The majority of family owned businesses in SA start relatively small as ‘Small-Medium 
Enterprises’ (SMEs).155 These businesses start operating as informal then later change to a 
formal sector.  The formal sectors contribute to the economic development through job creation 
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and economic growth.
156
 It has been found that family owned businesses in SA account for 65% 
of all business enterprises; however less than 33% of family owned businesses survive to second 
generation and less than 18% survive to third generation.
157
 Any business irrespective of the size 
has governance challenges and needs to implement governance practises within the framework 
of the company. As soon as the company has shareholders and stakeholders the corporate 
governance regime for South African companies consist of the King III report as guidelines 
which they need to comply with. The King report has a board structure that companies need to 
apply. The composition of the board for South African companies is explained next.
158
  
4.3 BOARD STRUCTURE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
South Africa has a unitary board structure which means that there is a single board of directors 
comprising executive and non-executive directors.
159
 Companies in South Africa differ in their 
board composition structure depending on the type of business. The King III report applies to all 
entities regardless of the size or the form of the entity. Therefore its board composition is used in 
this report. King III follows an ‘apply or explain’ basis approach which means that entities need 
to apply the principles and should they decide not to apply then explain the reason for not 
applying.  
4.3.1 Composition of the Board of Directors 
The King III states that the board should comprise of a balance between executive and non-
executive directors. The majority of directors should be non-executive directors as this prevents 
any possible conflict of interest. The directors should compose of different skills, experiences, 
and backgrounds. There should be a balance of power between directors so as to prevent any 
individual from dominating the decision making of the board. 
160
 South Africa has recently 
developed King IV which caters for SME’s and recommends them to have a board structure 
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which should disclose practices but may vary from SME depending on the size, resources, and 
complexity of strategic objectives and nature of the operations and impact of the business.
161
 
4.3.1.2 DUTIES OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
 The board is responsible to act as the focal point for corporate governance. 
 The board should have a charter which states its responsibilities. 
 The board is responsible to direct, and govern in ensuring the effectiveness of the 
company.
162
 
 The focal point of the corporate governance structure is the board. Furthermore it serves 
as the link between the company and the stakeholders. The stakeholders should be 
engaged in the business so as to create trust and confidence in the company.  
 The values that should be adhered to in the company should be set by the board. 
 The board has a responsibility to put strategies into place in order to account for changing 
external environment and market conditions. 
 The appointment of the Chief Executive officer depends entirely on the board of 
directors. 
 The succession plan for the CEO, senior executives and other board members should be 
put in place. 
 The board has a responsibility to provide leadership and taking the company in the right 
direction so as to achieve continual survival of the company. 
 Risk management in a company is the board’s responsibility. The board should oversee 
the risks areas in a company and be able to take certain measures to prevent such risks. 
 The board should always act in the best interest of the company. The decisions taken by 
the board should place the interest of the company first and not of the individual 
person.
163
  
It is submitted that board of directors are the main important pillars of any organisation. A 
company without board of directors might end up making wrong decisions. The board of 
directors are much needed for their skills and expertise to operate effectively in a changing 
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environment. Boards are expected to act in the interest of the company in order to take solid 
decisions for the company.   
4.3.2 Selection Process of Directors 
The appointment process of directors should be done formally and transparent by the board as a 
whole. It is the duty of the board to ensure that the potential directors are competent and will 
bring positive contribution to decisions taken by the board. The background of the potential 
directors should be investigated to ensure that they have not been declared delinquent or serving 
probation.
164
 King IV recommends that prior to the appointment of a candidate the governing 
body should consider various factors which include the skills, knowledge and experience of the 
candidate, reputation, existence of conflict of interest and diversity.
165
There are some 
developments in King IV as the report considers the existence of conflict of interest when 
selecting the board of directors as well as diversity being one of the factors that should be 
considered which will impact positively on the organisation to attract investors. 
4.3.3 Qualifications of Board Members 
The board should consider the academic qualifications, technical expertise, relevant industry 
knowledge, experience, nationality, age, race and sex. The effectiveness of the board should be 
considered based on the size, diversity and demographics.
166
 It is submitted that the members of 
the board should be diverse with regards to gender, race and age. Male and female with different 
ages that are of different race should qualify to serve on the board. Furthermore should possess 
academic qualifications and expertise which are in line with the company. 
 
4.3.4 Number of Members in the Board 
One of the factors that need to be taken into account when forming a board structure is the needs 
and circumstances of the company;
167
However, the number of board members should comprise a 
minimum of two executive directors for all types of companies stated by King III which is the 
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CEO and the finance function director.
168
 King IV states that in order to determine the number of 
members who should serve on the board, certain factors should be considered:
169
 
 The circumstances, needs and nature of its business should be considered. 
  A mixture of executive and non-executive and independent members 
 A sufficient qualified members should be part of the board 
 The skills, knowledge and experiences of members are considered. 
 Diversity of members 
With regards to the number that should serve on the board, both the South African legislation 
there are not much changes from the King III to King IV as they both state that members should 
be skilled and experienced however both these legislations do not state the maximum number of 
directors who should serve on the board but only state the minimum number of two directors 
which should be the CEO and at least one other executive. 
4.3.5 Independence of Board Members 
An independent director is a person who is not an executive officer or employee of the company. 
An independent director must not have a relationship which would be seen as interfering with the 
exercise of independent judgement in carrying out the responsibilities of a director.
170
 When 
electing the board members, there should be a balance of power and authority on the board. The 
majority of members should be preferably independent directors as this reduces any risks of 
potential conflicts of interests.
171
 The board should be led by an independent non- executive 
chairman, and should the chairman not be independent the company should disclose in the 
integrated report and provide reasons to justify.
172
 
4.3.6 Compensation of Board Members 
A company is recommended to adopt policies and practises for remuneration that will impact 
positively by creating value in a company over the long term. These adopted policies should be 
aligned with the strategies of the company as well as the contribution of the executives to 
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performance which needs to be reviewed regularly. When assessing the remuneration of 
executives, the factors which are outside the influence of the executives should not be taken into 
account.
173
 It is the responsibility of the board to ensure that a company promotes a culture that 
supports innovativeness with short and long term related rewards that are fair and achievable.
174
 
The remuneration committee works hand in hand with the board in setting and administering 
remuneration policies in the long term interest of the company.  The annual bonuses should be 
related to the annual objectives achieved by executives.
175
  
4.3.7 Chairman of the Board 
The chairman of the board should be appointed and the roles of chairman and CEO should be 
separated.
176
 The chairman is recommended by the King III to be an independent non-executive. 
The appointment of the chairman should be done on an annual basis.
177
 The chairman should be 
free from conflict of interest on appointment. A lead independent non-executive director can be 
appointed at the absence of the chairman. King III emphasises on the independence of the 
chairman which should be monitored; furthermore, the role of the chairman is to monitor the 
conflicts in a company. The role that is obviously played by the chairman is to govern the 
workings of the board which include directing the meetings of the board and a peacemaker when 
elements of the board differ. However, the board should not use its power to towards certain 
agendas.
178
 
4.3.8 Conflict Resolution 
The internal and external disputes are resolved efficiently and effectively by the board. The 
board ensures that mechanisms are put in place in order to manage disputes when they arise and 
resolve them as effectively as possible.
179
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4.3.9 Committees of the Board 
The board is responsible to appoint the audit, risk, remuneration and nomination committees. 
There is no need for small companies to establish formal committees but they should ensure that 
the functions are appropriately addressed by the board.
180
The audit and remuneration committees 
are required to be chaired by independent non-executive director. The establishment of risk, 
remuneration and nomination committees is vital and is part of the governance process which 
should be clearly agreed. Board committees should be disclosed in the integrated report. 
181
 King 
IV report recommends an additional committee which is the social and ethical outcomes 
committee. The social and ethical outcomes committee is a statutory requirement for some 
companies however companies should considered establishing it as it a matter of good practice to 
report on organisational ethics and sustainable development and stakeholder inclusivity.
182
 
4.3.10 Accounting and Auditing 
The establishment of an audit committee is vital which comprises of a majority of independent 
non-executive directors. The majority of these members should be financially literate. The 
chairperson of the committee should be an independent non-executive director. The company 
should disclose its annual report and if the committee has adopted the terms of reference and if 
these have been complied with. 
183
 
4.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BRAZIL 
Brazil is mainly represented by 85% family owned businesses. Brazil’s family business sector is 
largely composed of small-sized firms – only 15% of the country’s family businesses are 
large.
184
 Since 1985, Brazil became a free country when the military-ran government gave up 
control to the people of Brazil. This caused Brazil to grow to be the 5
th
 largest country in the 
world by population and 8
th
 largest economy.
185
 The economy brought jobs and new 
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opportunities along with lawlessness and corruption. In the past, Brazil’s perception in business 
was a country with high risk to do business. Groups such as the Brazilian Institute of Corporate 
Governance (IBGC) were formed in order to minimize the risks and remove negative views on 
investing in Brazil. Brazil has few government rules to follow with regards to corporate 
governance therefore companies are not bound by any rules but it’s entirely up to them to 
comply.
186
  
The law that regulates corporate governance in Brazil is the Brazilian Corporate Law, the 
Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) and the rules of the Sao Paulo Stock 
Exchange (BM &FBovespa). Recommendations on Corporate Governance were published by 
the CVM in 2002 which are voluntary. Brazil has a non- profit organisation called the Brazilian 
Institute of Corporate Governance (IBGC). The aim of this organization was to promote good 
corporate governance practices in Brazil. The IBGC published the Code of Best Practice in 2010 
of Corporate Governance which is the Brazilian Corporate Governance code. The guidelines of 
this code apply to any kind of organization and adherence to the code is voluntary. Therefore it is 
submitted that family owned companies can adhere to the Code of Best Practice of Corporate 
Governance as the codes apply to any kind of organisation.
187
  
4.5 BOARD STRUCTURE IN BRAZIL 
The board of directors consists of a collective body where the performance depends entirely on 
characteristics of each member and their individual respect. Brazil has a two-tier board system. A 
two-tier board system consists of two separate boards of directors that work together to govern 
the business. These two boards consist of the Management board and the Supervisory board.
188
 
An advisory board is considered as an informal group which consists of internal and independent 
members who encourages the adoption of best practices of corporate governance. It is particular 
for companies who are in the early stages of adopting good corporate governance practises. The 
difference with the advisory board to the normal management board of directors is that it does 
not have the power to make decisions. It acts as an advisor and proposes recommendation to the 
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company. The advisory board is recommended especially to private and family owned 
companies.
189
 
 Each member in the board possesses certain characteristics which allow them to make reliable 
decisions for the betterment of the organisation. The composition of board of directors must 
consist of members with different attributes such as age, gender, diversity of knowledge, 
experiences, behaviours, and cultural aspects. In addition, the executive management must define 
and promote policies which allows for women to have equal opportunities for high positions 
within the organisation.
190
 
4.5.1 Composition of the Board of Directors 
The board is the principal of the organisation and oversees that the objectives of corporate 
governance are met. The main objectives of the board are to serve as the guardian of the 
principles, values, purpose and system of governance of the organisation. The board is 
responsible to monitor the executive management putting the interest of the organisation first. It 
is recommended that every organisation should have a board structure which comprises of 
between five and nine members which are elected by its owners and the stakeholders should be 
taken into account.
191
  
 
4.5.1.2 Duties of Board of Directors 
 According to the IBGC, the implementation of the board should be considered by every 
organisation.
192
 It is submitted that family owned companies should also practise the 
principle of having a board in its structure as stated by the IBGC. 
 The board is responsible for ensuring that the values and principles of the organisation 
are identified, discussed and distributed. The strategies identified by the board should be 
defined and decisions taken that protect the value of the organisation. The board should 
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promote an environment where the people in the organisation can express their thoughts 
and ethical dilemmas.
193
 
 The role of the board is to ensure that all the stakeholders receive benefits which are 
appropriate with the organisation and risks which the stakeholders are exposed to. 
194
 
 The board should ensure that the decisions and actions are aligned with the principles and 
values of the organisation. It should propose the application of corrective measures as 
provided by the code of conduct.
195
  
 In order for board the board to fulfil its mission, it must clearly define the purpose, 
principles and values of the organisation and ensure they are protected.
196
 
 The board is responsible to select the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in an organisation 
and other executive management members.
197
 
 The board’s role is to value and protect the organisation while ensuring that the return on 
investments of the company are met as well as taking the interests of all the stakeholders 
into consideration.
198
  
 The board is responsible for the sustainability of the company as well as corporate risk 
management through the use of social and environmental considerations in its decision 
making.
199
 
 The general meeting is essential for the appointment of the members of the board of 
directors. These members of the board are responsible to guide and oversee the 
management of the board while being accountable to the shareholders. The board is also 
responsible to appoint and dismiss the CEO.
200
  
4.5.2 Selection Process of Board of Directors 
The process for selecting directors must be observant of the principles and values of the 
organisation as well as the level of maturity, its strategy and expectations with regards to the 
performance of the board. It is recommended that the profile of the desired candidate be 
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disclosed in advance as well as desired qualifications and expectations which are required for the 
position.
201
 
 
4.5.3 Qualifications of Board Members 
Board members should possess certain characteristics which include:
202
 
  Strategic vision for the organisation 
 The member should show commitment to the organisation principles, values and code of 
conduct. 
 The member should have the ability to communicate with other members of the board 
 The member should be knowledgeable with regards to corporate governance practices. 
 The member should be able to work as part of the team. 
 The member should have the knowledge with regards to corporate legislation and 
regulation. 
 
4.5.4 Number of Members in the Board 
The recommended number of board members should be between five and eleven. This number 
differs according to the size of the organization, its complexity and the stage where it is in its life 
cycle and whether the creation of committees is viable.
203
 The reason for this low number of 
directors in Brazil is due to the fact that companies in Brazil are run by families that have 
founded the organization.
204
 
 
4.5.5 Independence of Board Members 
Once the board members have been elected they have the responsibility to fulfil their duties to 
the organisation regardless of whoever appointed them to the position. The members should 
perform their duties without any emotional attachment involved. Furthermore; they must perform 
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their duties without being personal influenced. They must put the interest of the organisation 
without the influence of any personal or professional relationship. It is submitted that board 
members should perform their specified duties without pushing any personal gain agendas. The 
majority of directors should be independent.
205
 These independent directors must not have a 
previous tie with the company and be outsiders to the company’s internal workings.The 
independence of directors should be assessed by the board. The board members who are 
conflicted on a specific matter should not take part in the decisions on that specific issue. 
206
 
 
4.5.6 Compensation of Board Members 
The board members must be effectively compensated taking into consideration the market 
conditions, the qualifications and the value that is generated by the organisation and the risks 
involved. Proper compensation motivates the members to fulfil their duties adequately and 
prevents conflicts of interest. The organisation must have transparent and proper procedures for 
compensation of board members. The members should be compensated based on the dedication 
and productivity of work they have done. The Chairman may receive additional compensation 
based on the work performed but should not be overly compensated greater than the other board 
members. The annual compensation of board members should be individually disclosed.
207
 
 
4.5.7 Chairman of the Board 
The chairman of the board has a responsibility to seek performance from the board and from the 
individual members. The guidance of the board as well as trained diversified board of directors 
contributes positively to a dynamic board. One of the recommendations by the Brazilian code is 
that the Chairman and Chief executive officer (CEO) positions should not be held by the same 
person. Furthermore the CEO should not be a member of the board.
208
 First, the chairman is 
responsible to define the objectives and program of the board. Secondly the chairman ensures 
that the board receives all the required information to exercise its duties in a timely manner. 
Thirdly, the chairman is responsible to chair the meetings as well as organise and coordinate the 
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agenda. Fourthly, the chairman has a responsibility to coordinate activities, assign deadlines and 
monitor the evaluation process to board members. Finally the chairman has a responsibility to 
create a relationship with the chief executive officer, communicating the resolutions which are 
adopted by the board of directors.
209
 
 
4.5.8 Conflict Resolution between Members 
Shareholders are recommended to have a right to vote. The conflicts that may arise in the 
organization should be resolved through mediation and if that fails, arbitration should take place 
in order to resolve conflicts.
210
 The Brazilian corporate governance recommends the existence of 
a family council for any potential conflicts. The family owned companies in Brazil are 
recommended to have a family council in order to discuss the position and expectations of the 
business. The main role of the family council would be to set boundaries between family 
interests and business interests and succession planning. The objectives of the family council are 
different from that of the board of directors and should not be confused.
211
 
 
4.5.11 Committees of the board of directors 
The members of the committees should be formed by members of the board of directors. They 
should possess relevant knowledge and experience to the organisation. The board committees in 
Brazil consist of the audit committee, finance committee, human resources or compensation 
committee. In each of these committees there should be at least three members who have the 
knowledge in the specific field as well as one expert in the respective subjects. Any type of 
organisation is recommended to have an audit committee regardless of its nature or its life cycle 
stage. One of the important functional aspects in Brazil is the fiscal board. Fiscal boards differ 
slightly from audit committees as they do not get much involved in the planning and supervision 
of the audit process, hiring and firing of auditors and other key aspects of corporate risk 
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management and handling conflicts of interests The purpose of the fiscal council is to provide 
oversight and control of the administration.
212
  
4.5.12 Accounting and Auditing 
The establishment of the audit committee is vital which comprises of members with finance 
knowledge. There should be at least one member that represents the minority shareholders. The 
financial statements should be published quarterly long with the details of the factors that 
affected the performance of the business over the quarter.
213
 
In a study by the Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance (IBGC), it was found that family 
owned companies that practice corporate governance principles are more successful than 
companies that do not.
214
 The IBGC concluded that family owned companies that incorporate 
corporate governance practices and principles are on average, more profitable, and more finance 
leveraged that those without corporate governance. The IBGC concluded that the adoption of 
corporate governance practices is an essential step towards the success of the business. 
4.6 COMPARISON BETWEEN BRAZIL AND SOUTH AFRICA 
Corporate governance in Brazil has similarities and differences with corporate governance in 
South Africa.  First, one of the similarities is that the recommendations are voluntary but 
compliance with the listings is compulsory in both countries. 
The framework of corporate governance in Brazil is more complex than the corporate 
governance framework in South Africa. The IBGC is a self- regulatory forum in Brazil which is 
for privately held and government owned companies. The Brazilian code has become used as the 
primary reference for corporate governance practices in general. South Africa has a unitary 
structure while Brazil consists of a two tier board structure. Both these countries require 
independent executive directors who have the relevant skills, education and experience; however 
the difference with Brazil is that family owned companies are required to have an advisory board 
which encourages the adoption of practises of corporate governance. Therefore Brazil 
recommends a better board structure which caters for family owned companies; however South 
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Africa has recently developed King IV which caters for SME’s and recommends them to have a 
board structure which should disclose practices but may vary from SME’s depending on the size, 
and nature of the business. 
In both these countries, the interests of stakeholders are emphasized, transparency, equal 
treatment of shareholders and disclosure requirements. 
The formal selection process for both these countries differs. South Africa recommends the 
process for selecting members be done formally and transparent and the selected candidate have 
the relevant skills, knowledge and experience. Brazil recommends that the selection process for 
directors must observe the principles and values as well as the strategy of the organisations. In a 
case where the board renews its term, it must define the profile of the candidate in advance 
which discloses the required qualifications and expectations regarding the position. 
In both these countries the appointment of the CEO depends entirely on the board. The role of 
the board in Brazil and South Africa is to ensure that the company is managed and controlled in 
the right direction. 
The number of members in the board structure of South Africa should be a minimum of two 
executive directors whilst Brazil has a minimum of 5 and maximum of eleven. South Africa does 
not state the maximum number of directors that should serve on the board. 
South Africa and Brazil both focuses on having a board that has majority independent members. 
Proper compensation of directors is recommended in both these countries which serve as a 
motivation in order for directors to perform and exceed on their duties.  
The roles of CEO and chairman in South Africa and Brazil should be separated. 
The conflict that arises in South African family owned companies should be resolved by the 
board; however, in Brazil the conflict is resolved through mediation by a family council. A 
family council is an organ that is responsible to maintain family matters which are separate from 
the organisation in order to prevent family conflicts that arise between family members in the 
business. A family council’s objective is not the same as the objectives of the board of directors. 
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A family owned company should create a family council in order to discuss family matters and 
the association of the expectation of members in relation to the organisation.
215
 
Responsibilities of the Family Council: 
 A family council is responsible to define the limits between the family and the interest of 
the organisation. 
 A family council protects and stabilises family values using the organisation in promoting 
unity amongst members and continuity in the family. 
 Family council defines the criteria that protect the assets, growth, diversification and 
administration of the organisation of the family. 
 It defines criteria for family members who will be appointed to act as employees in the 
organisation. 
 It further defines succession, transmission of property and inheritance plans.216 
 
SA has committees in its board structure which comprises of remuneration, risk, audit and 
nomination committee whilst Brazil has, finance, audit, human resource, and compensation 
committee; however, the fiscal committee is the most important functional committee. The South 
African and Brazilian financial and auditing committee is very vital and requires members with 
finance knowledge. In South Africa, the members in the committee should comprise of majority 
independent non-executive directors. 
4.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FROM UNITED STATES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The United States corporate governance is regulated by legislation as well as rules of stock 
exchanges. The family owned business is the strength of the economy in the United States.  It 
has been found that 85% of all the businesses in the US are family owned;
217
 furthermore, 60% 
of the employees are part of family owned businesses. In 2000 the gross domestic product for 
family owned businesses accounted to 50%, and the result for this was a proper governance of 
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family owned companies. 
218
 Just over half of the public listed companies in US are family 
owned. The growth of jobs in US represents more than 75% of net growth.
219
 This further shows 
that US small-medium family owned companies practice corporate governance as they grow to 
be large listed companies on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 
The Unites States’ rules are continually updated with changing legislative and market 
requirements. The standards of corporate responsibility, integrity and accountability to 
shareholders must be maintained. The boards of directors in the US must comprise of majority 
independent directors.
220
 Furthermore a board that functions well can comprise of more than one 
non-independent director and that person must be familiar with the company and its operations.  
A board that is effective should have skilled, experienced and educated members. The board is 
required to ensure that appropriate risk management plan be in place so as to prevent any 
challenges that may occur.
221
 
There must be regular meetings with non-executive directors.
222
 There must be a compensation 
committee which is entirely made up of independent directors. The compensation committee will 
determine the performance of the CEO against the goals of the company and determine the 
CEO’s compensation level as well as the compensation for other executives and the incentives 
they are entitled to.
223
 
The focus of corporate governance in the United States is on public listed companies and the 
compliance is mandatory. The US laws requires full disclosure of executive remuneration. The 
board must comprise of majority independent non-executive directors. The US rules states that 
the role of the CEO and chairman need not be separated. Furthermore a code of conduct is 
required from companies. The US regulations do not acknowledge the interest of stakeholders 
other than the shareholders except in a requirement of fair deal by the directors.
224
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Companies in the US must disclose corporate governance guidelines which consist of director 
qualifications, director responsibilities, director access to management, director compensation, 
director continuing education, management succession and annual performance evaluation of the 
board.
225
 The business code of conduct must be adopted and disclosed along with the ethics for 
directors, officers and employees. The conduct should address the conflict of interest, 
confidentiality, compliance with the rules and to promote ethical behavior through the 
encouragement of whistle -blowers.
226
A company that violates the listing standards will be 
issued a public reprimand letter and for companies that continue violating the rules will be 
penalised through delisting or suspension.
227
 
4.10 CONCLUSION 
The basis of this chapter was to do a comparative study between South Africa and Brazil in 
terms of corporate governance practises with regards to family owned companies. It appears at 
first glance that both countries have same features both economically and cultural to a certain 
extent and that the corporate governance practices are similar. These two countries have different 
board structures. Brazil consists of a two-tier board which comprises of Management board and 
Advisory board; moreover, South Africa has a unitary board which consists of Management 
board. It has been shown that Brazil has an advisory board which focuses on family owned 
companies and South Africa had no board that primarily focused on family owned-firms; 
however, recently King IV has been developed with supplements that cater for SME’s. Family 
owned companies in Brazil are recommended to have a family council which will help in 
conflict resolution between members; however South Africa does not have any family council 
which primarily focuses on conflict resolution between family members. Conflicts in South 
Africa are recommended by King III to be resolved by board members of whom the majority of 
family owned companies do not really practise King III recommendations. South Africa has 
shown to recommend only a minimum number of members who should serve on the board while 
Brazil has both minimum and maximum number of board members. 
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The comparison between Brazil and South Africa has shown that Brazil has a better board 
composition structure as compared to South Africa. There were gaps in South African board 
structure which might have affected the survival of family owned companies; however recently 
the King IV report has been developed and has recommendations which will focus on SME’s. 
The research literature has shown that the United States is having a different way of corporate 
governance practises which are much more effective. It is also worth mentioning that in the 
United States family owned companies are compelled to practise corporate governance and those 
who fail to comply will be penalised through delisting or suspension where as in South Africa 
and Brazil companies should apply the corporate governance practises or explain the reason for 
applying and there is no penalty enforced to non-compliance therefore it is important to move 
from the Brazilian or South African approach and try to improve their corporate governance laws 
by copying some of the US laws. Therefore the final finding suggest that both South Africa and 
Brazil will gain by copying what the United States have done in terms of issuing penalties for 
non-compliance of corporate governance practises. Corporate governance in Brazil and US do 
cater for family owned companies in its regulations while South Africa just recently adopted 
King IV supplements which will cater for SME’s. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH 
The main purpose of this work was to establish the importance of corporate governance in terms 
of ownership and board composition on family-owned firm performance. A regulatory 
framework for corporate governance in South Africa does exist but further improvements are 
required which will have to focus more on family owned companies. King IV report has been 
developed which also focuses on SME’s, however, it has just been recently developed and is no 
guarantee that family owned companies will practice it. The most challenging issue facing family 
owned companies is the poor enforcement of the laws and regulations with regards to board 
composition structures. Brazil has a two tier board system which comprises of Management 
board and Advisory Board. The Advisory board focuses on family owned companies. South 
Africa has a unitary board which is a single board system which comprises of executive and non-
executive directors. 
The recommendations for South African companies is the King report which is voluntary for 
listed companies, and IBGC for Brazil  which is voluntary; however, the United States is ruled 
by the Sarben Oxly and New York Stock Exchange which is mandatory for listed companies.  
The development of corporate governance has been influenced by many theories which 
comprises of Agency theory, Shareholder theory, Stakeholder theory and Stewardship theory. 
The stakeholder theory was used in the research as Brazil and South Africa put more emphasis 
on the importance of stakeholders in an organisation. 
The key findings of this research have similarities between Brazil and South Africa. A number of 
corporate governance mechanisms have been identified such as the regulatory framework, the 
ownership structure; board composition of directors; shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ 
rights.  
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Both United States and Brazil have a minimum and maximum number of directors in their board 
structure whilst South Africa only has a specified minimum number of directors that should 
serve on the board. 
It has been shown that the roles of the members of the board need to be formalised and clear so 
as to be able to evaluate the performance of each board member. 
In sum it can be argued that corporate governance mechanisms in Brazil and South Africa are 
similar in many ways. Both these countries require independent non- executive directors in the 
board and the number of directors should be small as they are more effective. 
The board members in Brazil and South Africa are similar with regards to the number of 
independent directors in the board as they are likely to work in the best interest of the company 
towards maximizing shareholder value. 
Transparency and disclosure are the important principles of corporate governance, however it 
has been found that companies in Brazil decide on the information they want to disclose.  
 
5.2 CONCLUSION 
It has been shown that corporate governance has no set definition; however the need for it is un- 
deniable. Corporate governance comprises of policies, and practises which serve as the 
guidelines for the companies’ direction. These mechanisms are both mandatory and voluntary. 
The majority of family owned companies do not practice some of these corporate governance 
practises specifically with separating ownership from control of the business as they feel that 
they will lose the control of the business. South Africa has a well-developed corporate 
governance code. The revised codes in South Africa are found to be the most comprehensive in 
the world; however Brazil is still in the process to encourage compliance with its corporate 
governance codes. 
 
Corporate governance in South Africa comprises of the King Reports and the Companies Act. 
The King reports require companies to apply their policies and explain. However, the Companies 
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Act has principles that are mandatory for companies to apply.  Corporate governance ensures 
that the members of the board of directors are accountable for the running of the business. 
Investor confidence is achieved through the use of corporate governance characteristics which 
are transparency, accountability, and disclosure. 
It today’s world the need for corporate governance is important and a strong enforcement of 
regulatory systems of corporate governance is extremely important for the continued existence of 
family owned companies. South Africa has the regulatory systems for corporate governance; 
however family owned companies do not practice it as it just a recommendation. The majority of 
family owned companies are aware of corporate governance mechanisms but do not practice 
them as the rules do not really cater for them.  
The need to have a good corporate governance regime has been established as important for the 
country to attract investors. Investors will not take the risk of investing their capital in a country 
that does not protect their interests. Investors will examine the existence of corporate governance 
rules and regulations of that country prior to investing in any country.  
The board structure of a company plays a big role in the effectiveness of corporate governance of 
family owned businesses. This research has pointed out that the role of CEO and the Chairman is 
likely to be held by the same person in family owned companies; however, it is recommended 
that these roles be separated as it will create conflicts in the board specifically in family owned 
companies. 
Family owned companies in South Africa and Brazil do not survive to the third generation as 
they are likely to fail. The reasons for non- survival of these family owned companies are caused 
by various issues. As the family expands and family members become part of the company, the 
challenges start arising which will impact on the survival of the company. It has been argued that 
family owned companies are hesitant to include non-family members in the board structure of 
the company as they are scared of losing ownership of the family business. It can be submitted 
that family members in a company put their personal interest before of that of a company.  
The board structure is the main principal of any organisation. The decisions which may affect the 
company depend entirely on the board of directors. The stakeholder interests depend on the 
board of directors. An organisation without a proper board structure is likely to fail. Family 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
owned companies are likely to fail due to a lack of effective board structure; therefore, it can be 
concluded that board composition structure does affect the performance of a family owned 
company. The interests of all the stakeholders need to be taken into consideration at all times as 
they attract outside investors. 
 
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Companies with good corporate governance are in a better position to grow, and are able to 
retain and attract investors. As a family owned company has its challenges which might impact 
negatively on the growth of the firm, corporate governance is mostly needed to be practised. 
First, a family owned company should be able to employ outside people who will be part of the 
management, and not only have family members. This will help with making sound decisions 
that will benefit the company and not the individual family members. 
Secondly, a family owned company should have a formal board structure that has both executive 
and non-executive members who are not part of the family so that the decisions taken can benefit 
the shareholders and stakeholders of the company. Furthermore, the company should have a 
good board structure where the Chairman of the company is different from the CEO as there will 
be conflict of interests if the CEO is the same as the Chairman. 
Thirdly, a family owned company should have a family council where they discuss their family 
issues and disputes which might impact on the business as soon as there are conflicts amongst 
them. As the family business grows and succeeds to the next generation, there are bound to be 
conflicts between family members on different views about the future of the business. Carlock 
and Ward define conflict as ‘a natural part of human relationships, whether in a family or 
business setting. Conflict is neither positive nor negative; if handled correctly it leads to new 
thinking, better planning and decision – and a stronger sense of trust and commitment’. 228 In a 
family owned company, it is recommended to have a family governance which will help in 
aligning the needs of both the family and the business which will help with developing the vision 
for the future of the business. Having a family council will also help in reducing potential 
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conflicts between family members and discussing any issues of concern which need clarity. The 
family council can have a family constitution which will be a detailed document which outlines 
the values of the family and states the rules which family members have agreed upon. Therefore 
South Africa should copy from Brazil with regards to having an advisory board for family owned 
companies in their board structure. 
Fourthly, a family owned company should not hire family members simply because they are 
related to them and do not deserve to be part of the company due to their inadequate 
qualifications and experience; they will not bring any growth to the company but can only bring 
conflict and challenges to it. 
Family owned companies should compensate their employees properly and give them rewards 
for their performance in order to motivate them to work harder. 
Brazil can copy from South Africa in its selection process of the board of directors as it is done 
formally and transparent and that could lead to Brazil attracting investors as transparency is the 
core for attracting investors. 
It has been shown that the majority of family owned companies have only family members in the 
board, however; the outside non-executive directors are important for the board structure of the 
family business as they offer potential benefit of a more objective, fresh perspective on the 
business which can lead to greater business performance.  
The United States has formal governance mechanism for small and large companies and these 
mechanisms seem to be working for the survival of these companies.  Family owned companies 
in South Africa and Brazil should adopt formal governance mechanisms for both small and large 
businesses as they have a positive impact on the performance of the company. Adopting these 
mechanisms will help family members keep their fingers on the pulse of the progress of the 
business. Furthermore, the adoption of corporate governance mechanisms will help family 
members facilitate agreements and communicate better with other parties involved in the 
business.  
It has been identified that the board structure plays an important role in the effectiveness of the 
company. This research has identified that South Africa does not have a maximum number of 
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members who should serve on the board. It is recommended that the board members should be a 
maximum number of at least twelve directors in the board. 
It is recommended that evaluation of the boards should be performed on the individual directors 
and CEO. Evaluation should be based on the actual performance and decision making of 
directors adhering to corporate governance principles.                     
 
On the basis of the above conclusions, it has been argued that South Africa and Brazil have 
corporate governance laws; however, the challenge is that companies do not practice them as 
they are a recommendation. The research recommends that South Africa and Brazil should 
strengthen their legal and regulatory framework of corporate governance to be mandatory to 
some extent so that companies can apply them.  
It has been found that family owned companies have no specific legislation to govern them and 
this could be the result of high rate of failure. South Africa has already introduced King IV 
supplements which primarily focus on SME’s. The implementation of King IV supplements can 
have a positive effect on family owned companies as they will now be required to apply and 
explain the principles stated by King IV. 
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